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IN

THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,

NOS. 46645-2018

)
)

V.

Cassia County Case N0.

CR

16-18-2441

)
)

TERRY LEE SCHMIDTKE,

)

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF

)

Defendant-Appellant.

)
)

Has Schmidtke failed to show that the district court abused its sentencing discretion when
it imposed a uniﬁed 10-year sentence With three years ﬁxed upon Schmidtke’s guilty plea to felony
driving under the inﬂuence?

ARGUMENT
Schmidtke Has Failed Show That The
A.

District

Court Abused

Its

Sentencing Discretion

Introduction

In

May

2018, Idaho State Trooper Robert Allred stopped a vehicle in Cassia County for

failing to maintain its lane

and for

failing to stop at a stop sign

when

exiting 1-84.

(PSI, p.8.1)

PSI page numbers correspond With the page numbers of the electronic ﬁle “Appeal —
CONFIDENTIAL EXHIBITS.pdf.”
1

Trooper Allred made contact with the driver of the vehicle, Terry Schmidtke, and a passenger.
(Id.)

Schmidtke admitted

t0

smoking marijuana 30 minutes prior

methamphetamine the prior evening.

(Id.)

t0 the trafﬁc stop,

he was arrested, Schmidtke provided two .000

Pursuant

search

methamphetamine, and drug paraphernalia.
person. (Id.)

The

state

BAC

was under

consensual

a

to

t0 using

Trooper Allred deployed standard ﬁeld sobriety

and Schmidtke demonstrated impairment 0n the walk and turn and one leg stand

evaluation concluded that Schmidtke

and

After

tests. (Id.)

However, a subsequent

DRE

the inﬂuence 0f marijuana and stimulants.

(Id.)

of

(Id.)

tests

samples.

the

(Id.)

vehicle,

ofﬁcers

recovered

cocaine,

A marijuana pipe was also found 0n Schmidke’s

charged Schmidtke With felony driving under the inﬂuence

(3rd

offense or

more), possession of methamphetamine, driving without privileges, and possession of drug

paraphernalia? (R., pp.21-23; PSI, pp.12.).

Pursuant t0 an agreement with the

inﬂuence and the
L.11

— p.16,

state

L. 14.)

Schmidtke pled guilty

to felony driving

under the

agreed to dismiss the remaining charges. (R., pp.34-36; 9/18/18

The agreement did not bind

p.35; 9/ 1 8/ 1 8 TL, p.10, Ls. 1 3-17.)

years

state,

ﬁxed (R., pp.48-5 1;

The

either party’s sentencing

district court

Tr., p.6,

recommendations.

(R.,

imposed a uniﬁed 10-year sentence with three

11/27/1 8 Tr., p.20, Ls.21-25).

The court later denied Schmidtke’s

I.C.R.

35(b) motion for reduction of sentence. (R., pp.72-75.)

Schmidtke timely appealed.

(R., pp.59-61.)

On

appeal, Schmidtke contends the district

court imposed an excessive sentence. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 2-5.) However, a review ofthe record
reveals that Schmidtke has failed t0

2

show an abuse 0f discretion.

The two misdemeanor cases were adjudicated under Cassia Case No. CR-16-18-02405. (PSI,
alﬁ Mycourts.gov portal, State V. Schmidtke, Cassia County District Court Case No.

p.12;

ﬂ

CR-16-18-02405.)

Standard

B.

Of Review

The length 0f a sentence

is

reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard considering the

defendant’s entire sentence. State V. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007) (citing

50 P.3d 472, 475 (2002); State

State V. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460,

159 P.3d 838 (2007)).

It is

presumed

that the

is

a sentence

is

Huffman, 144 Idaho 201,

ﬁxed portion of the sentence

probable term of conﬁnement. Li. (citing State

Where

V.

V.

will be the defendant's

Trevino, 132 Idaho 888, 980 P.2d 552 (1999)).

Within statutory limits, the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that

it

a clear abuse 0f discretion. State V. Baker, 136 Idaho 576, 577, 38 P.3d 614, 615 (2001) (citing

State V. Lundguist, 134 Idaho 831, 11 P.3d

When

27 (2000)).

considering Whether the sentence

considers: (1) whether the

trial

was an abuse of

discretion, “this

Court

court correctly perceived the issue as one 0f

whether the trial court acted within the boundaries of its discretion
and consistently With the legal standards applicable; and (3) Whether the trial court
reached its decision by an exercise 0f reason.”
discretion; (2)

State V. Fisher, 162 Idaho 465,

834, 264 P.3d 935, 941 (201

The

C.

District

T0 bear
that,

398 P.3d 839, 842 (2017) (quoting State

V. Miller,

151 Idaho 828,

1)).

Court Acted Well Within

Its

Sentencing Discretion

the burden of demonstrating an abuse 0f discretion, the appellant

under any reasonable View 0f the

facts, the

sentence

was

excessive.

must

State V. Farwell, 144

Idaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d 397, 401 (2007). In determining whether the appellant met

this

the court considers the entire sentence but, because the decision t0 release the defendant

is

establish

burden,

on parole

exclusively the province 0f the executive branch, presumes that the determinate portion Will be

the period ofactual incarceration. State V. Bailey, 161 Idaho 887, 895, 392 P.3d 1228, 1236 (2017)

(citing Oliver,

144 Idaho

at

726, 170 P.3d at 391).

T0

establish that the sentence

was

excessive,

the appellant

must demonstrate

that reasonable

minds could not conclude the sentence was

appropriate to accomplish the sentencing goals of protecting society, deterrence, rehabilitation,

and retribution. Faiell, 144 Idaho

at

736, 170 P.3d at 401.

A sentence is reasonable “‘if

it

appears

necessary t0 accomplish the primary objective 0f protecting society and t0 achieve any 0r

all

the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, 0r retribution.’” Ba_iley, 161 Idaho at 895—96,

P.3d

at

1236—37 (quoting State

V.

McIntosh, 160 Idaho

1, 8,

0f

392

368 P.3d 621, 628 (2015)).

In this case, the district court referenced the appropriate sentencing goals and expressly

noted that

(1

it

had reviewed the PSI

1/27/18 Tr., p.17, Ls.7-20.)

report, evaluations,

and materials submitted by Schmidtke.

Relying primarily 0n Schmidtke’s extensive criminal record and

multiple prior felony DUIS, the district court imposed a uniﬁed 10-year sentence with three years

ﬁxed — Which was

similar t0 the state’s

recommendation of a uniﬁed 10-year sentence with

and-a—half years ﬁxed. (1 1/27/18 TL, p.10, Ls.5-7; p.17, L.21

ﬁxed sentence was well within

the statutory

maximum

—

p.20,

three-

L25.) The court’s 3-year

of 10 years for felony DUI, LC.

§ 18-

8005(6)(a), and constituted a reasonable exercise of the court’s discretion.
In particular, Schmidtke’s criminal historyjustiﬁed the sentence imposed.

investigation report reﬂected at least four prior

DUIS.3

(PSI, pp.9-12.)

Another

DUI

DUI

The presentence

convictions, with three 0f these being felony

charge from 1980 listed in the report did not contain

disposition information. (PSI, p.9.) Schmidtke himself estimated to the presentence investigator

that his alcohol use has

3

caused him problems including “10 DUIS.” (PSI, p.20.)

Schmidtke also

Schmidtke asserted that a ﬁfth DUI convictions indicated in his PSI was wrongly attributed t0
him due to identify theft. (1 1/27/18 Tr., p.5, Ls.4-22.) The district court accepted this
representation and entered a corresponding order amending the PSI. (R., p.47; 11/27/18 TL, p.5,
Ls.23-24.)

has convictions for driving on a suspended license and misdemeanor and felony possession of a
(PSI, pp. 10-1

controlled substance.

1.)

Additionally, Schmidtke has a

probation.

The PSI

documented history of

failing t0 abide

report indicates that Schmidtke’s probation

following probation Violations in

at

least three

by

the terms 0f

was revoked and/or terminated

separate cases.

(PSI, pp.10-1

1.)

Further,

Schmidtke’s prior conviction for driving 0n a suspended license (PSI, p.10), as well as the fact that

Trooper Allred’s license check indicated that Schmidtke’s driving privileges were suspended in

Utah

at the

time of his arrest in the present case4 (PSI, p.8), indicate that probation and a driver’s

license suspension

On appeal,
a Utah resident

would not necessarily keep Schmidtke off of the

roads.

Schmidtke’s primary argument appears to be centered around the fact that he

Who

has few connections t0 Idaho. (Appellant’s brief, p.3.)

is

Schmidtke told the

pre-sentence investigator that he would “never leave Utah again” (PSI, p.22), and argues 0n appeal
that “[t]here

would be

little

risk to the public, especially the Idaho public, if [he]

were placed on

probation rather than sentenced t0 a term of incarceration” and that as “a Utah resident, [he]

is

not

deserving of signiﬁcant punishment in Idaho.” (Appellant’s brief, pp.3-4.) However, the fact that

Schmidtke poses more danger to the citizens of Utah than of Idaho reasonably did not convince
the district court that probation

(1

1/27/18 TL, p.7, L.24

— p.8,

was appropriate

L.7),

in this case.

Further, as the prosecutor noted

Schmidke’s act 0f driving under the inﬂuence 0n an

freeway such as 1-84 (where individuals from other

states are likely to drive),

was

interstate

particularly

dangerous and concerning considering the speed 0f travel 0n such roads.

4

As noted

above, Schmidtke’s driving Without privileges charge associated With this case was

dismissed pursuant t0 a plea agreement.

On

appeal, Schmidtke also highlights the presentence investigator’s conclusion that

Schmidtke’s “propensity t0 drink and drive makes him a poor candidate for probation,” and notes
that this particular case did not involve alcohol.

investigator’s conclusion

was

still

(Appellant’s brief, p.4.)

However, the

well-founded in light of Schmidtke’s criminal history. At the

sentencing hearing, Schmidtke’s attorney acknowledged that Schmidtke had a “long problem With
alcohol and drugs and a long problem With driving

Tr., p.1 1,

Ls.17-20)

when he’s

either drinking or using” (1 1/27/ 1 8

— an observation which was corroborated by Schmidtke’s

prior diagnosis of

alcohol dependence, and his statements to the PSI investigator describing his prior heavy alcohol

use (PSI, pp.20-21). Schmidtke’s assertion that he has decreased (but not ceased) his alcohol use
reasonably did not eliminate the presentence investigator’s concern, or require the

district court to

place Schmidtke 0n probation in light 0fthe other factors inﬂuencing the sentencing determination.
In light of his extensive criminal history of driving under the inﬂuence and demonstrated

inability to

comply with the terms of probation,

the district court acted well within

its

discretion to

impose a 3-year ﬁxed sentence for felony driving under the inﬂuence. Schmidtke has therefore
failed t0 demonstrate that the district court

the district court’s

abused its sentencing discretion. This Court must afﬁrm

judgment 0f conviction.

CONCLUSION
The

state respectfully requests this

DATED this

11th

Court t0 afﬁrm the judgment of the

day of October, 2019.

Mark W. Olson
MARK W. OLSON

/s/

Deputy Attorney General

district court.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I

HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this

copy of the attached
iCourt File and Serve:
correct

11th

day of October, 2019, served a true and

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF to the attorney listed below by means of

ANDREA W. REYNOLDS
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documents@sapd.state.id.us

/s/

Mark W. Olson

MARK W. OLSON
Deputy Attorney General

